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Breaking Through the Silence: Illegality of
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DanielSperling*
I. INTRODUCTION

For more than thirty years, hospitals in most developed countries of the
world have been performing resuscitation procedures in order to restore
consciousness, vigor, or "life" to patients whose hearts have stopped
beating or whose lungs have stopped functioning. Resuscitation procedures
include endotracheal intubation, placement of central venous catheters,
pericardiocentesis,
thoracotomy,
cutdown,
venous
surgical
placement.'
needle
intraosseous
and
cricothyroidotomy, liver biopsy,
While these procedures are critical components of effective and life-saving
healthcare, the methods by which physicians are trained to perform such
procedures are suspect.
In order to train medical students to do successful resuscitation
procedures, the procedures are practiced on "newly-dead" patients. This is
necessary because these procedures cannot be performed on a person who is
alive or on someone who has been dead too long. However, in many cases,
the practice of resuscitation procedures is carried out in a secretive way
without consent from the patient or next-of-kin. Coverage of these
procedures is limited and often is restricted to physicians writing short
articles in favor of the procedures. Like the United States and other
developed nations, Canada takes part in this "educational" effort, and like
other nations, the matter is free from the scrutiny of the Canadian Medical

* S.J.D. Candidate, Faculty of Law and the Centre for Bioethics, University of Toronto. This
paper was the winner of the Canadian Bioethics Society Paper Competition of 2003 and was
presented in the joint meeting of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities and the
Canadian Bioethics Society held in Montreal, October 24, 2003.
1. Jeffrey P. Bums et al., Sounding Board, Using Newly Deceased Patients to Teach
Resuscitation Procedures, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1652, 1652 (1994) (stating that the
intubation procedure is the most common resuscitation procedure and that, according to a
survey made in 1992, nearly forty percent of U.S. training programs in critical care
performed these procedures).
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Association.
Recently, however, the American Medical Association
(AMA) established new guidelines for physicians, requiring consent for
these procedures, and re-establishing respect for the recently deceased and
the next-of-kin.2 Some hospitals in the United States have announced that
they will review their policies as well; perhaps this indicates a change.3
Although this paper will not touch upon many delicate philosophical
questions such as the moral and legal status of the dead, whether the dead
have legal rights, and if so, what duties are owed to the dead,4 it will

question whether the dead can suffer harm or wrong in a way that is
protectable by law.5
The first section of this paper will discuss the different medical
associations' guidelines on practicing resuscitation procedures on newly
dead patients. The second part provides an analysis of the theoretical and
ethical discussion on such procedures. This will be done by applying the
four principles of bioethics to the practice of resuscitation procedures on the
newly dead: respect for autonomy, nonmalfeasance, beneficence, and
justice. The issue of consent and whether it should be required before
certain procedures are preformed will be discussed. The background of the
consent requirement will be examined by looking at four different sources:
the general common law principles of consent, the statutes that deal with
consent in general, the statutes that discuss the treatment of the corpse, and
the regulations concerning research on human beings. Two basic questions
will then be examined: (1) whether implied or presumed consent is
sufficient for practicing resuscitation procedures on the "newly-dead," and
(2) who is the appropriate substitute decision-maker from whom consent
should be obtained.
After answering these questions, the legal
consequences arising from performing the practice on deceased persons
2. Reports of the Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs (CEJA), Am. Med. Assoc.
(AMA), Performing Procedures on the Newly Deceased for Training Purposes (5-A-01);
CEJA OPINION 8.181: PERFORMING PROCEDURES ON THE NEWLY DECEASED FOR TRAINING
PURPOSES, 77 ACAD. MED. 1212-16 (2002), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/

category/8509.html [hereinafter CEJA ETHICS OPINION E-8.181 ]

3. Paul Glader, Doctors Question Use of Dead or Dying Patientsfor Training, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at B1.
4. See Daniel Sperling, Maternal Brain Death, AM. J.L. & MED. (forthcoming 2004).
See also Joel Feinberg, The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies, 15 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31
(1985); Mathew H. Kramer, Do Animals andDead People Have Legal Rights?, 14 CAN. J.L.
& JuRis. 29 (2001) (discussing legal rights). For a broader discussion on the issue of the
dead's interest see Jessica Berg, Grave Secrets: Legal & Ethical Analysis of Postmortem
Confidentiality, 34 CONN. L. REv. 81, 90-93 (2001).
5. See generally Joan C. Callahan, On Harming the Dead, 97 ETHICS 341 (1987)
(arguing against the claim that the dead can be harmed). Cf 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 83-84 (1984) (arguing for a posthumous

harm made to the surviving interests of the deceased).
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without consent will be reviewed.
II. THE MEDICAL PERSPECTIVE
The problem raised in this paper presents an ethical dilemma: the choice
between the obligation to educate medical trainees effectively and the
obligation to protect the physical and psychological integrity of the patients
and their families facing the death of their beloved. If typical resuscitation
procedures, such as opening an airway with a tube through the mouth and
into the trachea, drawing blood from a major vein, inserting a needle or
knife and a tube into the neck, and opening the chest wall, can be performed
6
without asking for consent from the family, then the obligation to educate
future clinicians must have a strong justification. But is this so?
There are some existing guidelines from ethical medical institutions that
address the issue of the newly dead. While the Canadian Medical
Association (CMA) does not have specific guidelines on the issue of
practicing on the newly dead, the CMA Code of Ethics has a good
7
description of the conflict that confronts physicians. The Code requires the
' 8
physician to "consider first the well-being of the patient, to treat "all
9 and to "refuse to participate in or support practices
patients with respect,"
However, the Code also encourages
that violate basic human rights."'
physicians to "engage in lifelong learning and to maintain and improve12
to "teach and be taught,"'
professional knowledge, skills, and attitudes,""
and to "accept a share of the profession's responsibility to society in matters
relating to ...health education."'

13

As evidenced, the Code consists of contradicting articles when applied to
the practice of resuscitation procedures on the recently deceased. Article 14
of the Code may resolve the conflict by providing that, if a procedure is
recommended for the benefit of others (for example, in matters of public
health), then the physician is asked to inform14 the patient of this fact and to
consent.
proceed only with explicit informed
6. D. Gary Benfield et al., Teaching Intubation Skills Using Newly Deceased Infants,
265 JAMA 2360, 2360 (1991). See Christopher J. Denny et al., 17 J. EMERGENCY MED.949,
951 (1991) (setting forth reasons for not obtaining consent).
7. CAN. MED. AssOC. (CMA), CODE OF ETHICS, PREFACE, available at http://
www.cma.ca [hereinafter CMA CODE OF ETHICS].
8.

Id.atART. 1.

9. Id. at ART. 2.
10. Id. at ART. 33.
11.

Id.atART. 5.

12.
13.
14.

Id. at ART. 36.
CMA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 7, at ART. 30..
Id. atART. 14.
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A different situation exists in the United States. The AMA issued
specific guidelines on practicing resuscitation procedures on the recently
deceased in December 2002.
The AMA recommends that training
procedures should not be undertaken without reasonable efforts to obtain
informed consent from the families within a reasonable time frame. 15
However, when these efforts fail, the AMA states that training supervisors
must forgo the training opportunity. 6 AMA guidelines also emphasize that
teaching life-saving skills should be the culmination of a structured training
sequence, rather than random opportunities, and that practice on the newly
dead should be performed in a dignified way.17
Other American groups have been setting guidelines for performing
procedures on the newly dead. The "Research Involving the Comatose and
Cadavers" Report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 8 also
supports the position that a reasonable effort is necessary to obtain specific
consent from the next-of-kin when the research is "beyond the normal
scope of teaching and research."' 19
A more general instruction on practicing resuscitation procedures has
been issued by the American Heart Association (AHA). The AHA stated in
its 1992 guidelines that the practice of resuscitation procedures is ethically
justifiable and that sensibilities of the family and staff involved in it should
be compassionately respected. It also stated that consent should be
obtained whenever practical.2 °
In comparison to North America, stronger professional guidelines appear
across Europe. The Norwegian Medical Association's Ethics Committee
has ruled that the use of newly dead patients for instruction of intubation

15. CEJA ETICS OPINION E-8.181, supra note 2. It is interesting to note the reason for
the AMA's consent requirement. The AMA stated that obtaining consent respects both the
wishes of the family and the memory of the deceased. In the author's opinion, it should be
exactly for the opposite reason: respect for the wishes of the deceased and respect for the
(current) memory of the family.
16. Id.
17. See James P. Orlowski et al., The Ethical Dilemma of Permitting the Teaching and
Perfectingof Resuscitation Techniques on Recently Expired Patients, 1 J. CLIN. ETHICS 20 1,
202 (1990).
18. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
&
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING THE
COMATOSE AND

CADAVERS, in IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RESEARCH REGULATIONS 39-41 (1983) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N STUDY]. See also Orlowski et al., supranote 17, at 204.
19. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N STUDY, supra note 18, at 39-41.
20. Emergency Cardiac Care Comm. & Subcomm., Am. Heart Assoc., Guidelines
for

CardiopulmonaryResuscitation & Emergency Cardiac Care VIII." Ethical Considerations in
Resuscitation,268 JAMA 2282, 2282 (1992).
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21 The British Medical
techniques should be discouraged in Norway.
Association's guidelines also prohibit the practice of intubation on recently
dead patients, except in the cases of patients with severe craniofacial
injuries. 22
It is clear that most of the medical associations, even if they have
guidelines on the issue of practicing on deceased patients, are not-for-profit
membership organizations and only represent physicians. Much of their
work in ethics is intended to provide guidance to physicians, but it is not
expected that it will be endorsed by every healthcare entity in the country
where they practice. Thus, healthcare facilities do not have the authority to
sanction physicians for unethical conduct, and medical practices that are
related to physicians' work is likely to be governed by state law or common
law principles in general, rather than the healthcare facility.

III. THE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Principlesof Biomedical Ethics

Four major principles exist in biomedical ethics: respect for autonomy,
the principle of nonmalfeasance, the principle of beneficence, and the
principle of justice.23 Respect for autonomy means not only a respectful
24
attitude but also respectful action; it involves acknowledging decision25
making rights and enabling persons to act autonomously. Therefore, since
the newly dead cannot make decisions regarding the appropriate treatment
of their body after death (assuming that there is not an advance directive), it
is an ethical imperative to enable the next-of-kin to make these decisions on
behalf of the recently dead on the principle of autonomy. Upon death,
people enjoy autonomy in some regards. One such aspect is the proper
handling of the body after death. The source of such autonomy exists in the
social circumstances in which the dead was and still is (with regard to
certain issues) engaged.
The second principle of biomedical ethics, the principle of
26
nonmalfeasance, asserts an obligation not to inflict harm on another.
While to "wrong" someone means to violate someone's right, the concept
of "harm" in this context need not involve such violation nor be restricted to
21. Denny et al., supra note 6, at 949.
22. Id.
23. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS,
(4th ed. 1995).
24. Id. at 125.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 189.
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rights possessed.2 7 Rather, the term is so broad that it includes discomfort,
humiliation, and offense.28 Even if the deceased's family experiences the
humiliation or the emotional discomfort, the proposed medical procedure
on the dead is the direct cause for such harm.
The principle of beneficence requires protecting and defending the rights
of others, preventing harm to others, and removing conditions that will
cause harm to others.2 9 While there is hardly any doubt that practicing and
training life-saving procedures is enhances the welfare of others (and
society in general), it is still necessary to respect the newly dead by
requesting consent. By protecting some of the potential rights the dead hold,
or alternatively, by preventing harm to the dead and consequently the nextof-kin, one is acting in accordance to the principle of beneficence. More
importantly, performing secretive medical procedures away from the public
eye with the intent of "benefiting" from an irreversible medical situation
creates mistrust and disrespect for the medical profession. In the long run
such a practice, when performed without consent, cannot be beneficial to
medicine and medical professionals.
The last principle of biomedical ethics is justice. Justice is traditionally
interpreted as fair, equitable, and appropriate treatment in light of what is
due or owed to persons. 30 To deny the recently deceased the benefit of
respectful treatment guaranteed by the legal and ethical mechanism of
consent or to distribute burdens unfairly upon a group of people just
because they are accessible in the emergency departments is to act
31
unjustly.

Having addressed these general principles and their application to the
practice on the "newly-dead," the arguments for and against the consent
requirement will be reviewed.
B. Opponents of the Consent Requirement
Opponents of the consent requirement argue that medical techniques that
are practiced on the newly dead are minimally invasive 32 and do not disrupt
"areas of the body exposed in a casket., 33 They further
claim that
27. Id.at 190.
28. Id. at 192.
29. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 23, at 259.
30. ld.at 327.
31. Id. at 329.
32. James P. Orlowski et al., The Ethics of Using Newly DeadPatientsfor Teaching and
PracticingIntubation Techniques, 319 N. ENG. J. MED. 439, 439 ("At worst, a tooth may be
broken or dislodged.").
33. Kenneth V. Iserson, Law Versus Life: The EthicalImperative to Practice and Teach
Using the Newly DeadEmergency DepartmentPatient, 25 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 91, 91
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performing and perfecting these techniques is justifiable from a medical
necessity and risk standpoint. 34 Accordingly, if the procedure is performed
incorrectly, precious time is lost and death may result. It is argued that
practicing resuscitation procedures not only has substantial social benefit,
but that society has a substantial interest in maintaining an optimal number
of emergency departments and emergency medical system personnel
3 5 The importance of these practices
proficient in life-saving procedures.
a duty on
derives both from societal and utilitarian ethics that impose
36 Indeed, it is
skills.
life-saving
emergency personnel to practice and teach
emphasized that from a teleological analysis using cadavers for teaching
37
purposes will benefit many living persons and that based on various
studies, there is an altruistic nature to the human being such that they would
38
consent to use of their body for the benefit of the greater good.
Further, opponents of the consent requirement add that practicing on
cadavers is better than other practices because it allows students to actualize
39
what they have been taught in the classroom. Further, they argue that it is
hard to justify inflicting suffering on animals to practice these procedures
40
when postmortem teaching is frequently available. The other alternative,
prolonging resuscitations beyond the point where living patients can
possibly benefit, is ethically corrupt and violates the ethical precepts of
and teach
patient autonomy and non-malfeasance when clinicians practice room.41
operating
the
in
patients
anesthetized
procedures on unsuspecting
Opponents of the consent requirement also highlight practical difficulties
that emerge from such a requirement. They argue that considering the
immediacy of the death, it is difficult and insensitive to request a proxy
consent and it creates discomfort for the person requesting the consent.
Further, they argue that it is preferable not to ask for permission from the
family because it is often refused, and thus, a decreased number of clinical
42
Asking for
personnel will be trained should consent be required.
team
resuscitation
the
usually
permission is also not practicable since
(1995).
34. Orlowski et al., supra note 17, at 201; Orlowski et al., supra note 32, at 439.
35. Kenneth V. Iserson, Requiring Consent to Practiceand Teach Using the Recently

Dead, 9 J. EMERGENCY

MED.

509, 509 (1991).

36. Iserson, supranote 33, at 94.
37. Orlowski et al., supra note 32, at 440.
38. Iserson, supra note 35, at 509.
39. Benfield et al., supra note 6, at 2363 (comparing the effectiveness of medical
students' training on cadavers as opposed to other techniques).
40. Iserson, supra note 33, at 92.
41. Id. See also Glader, supra note 3, at B1 (stating that hospitals continue to bill the
nearly dead patients' insurance company for the procedures performed for medical training).
42. Iserson, supranote 35, at 509.
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members are dispatched to other duties in the emergency department or the
hospital, the body is sanitized, and the equipment and the room are cleaned
and prepared for the next patient.43
In addition to the arguments for performing procedures without consent,
opponents of the requirement of consent offer some ethical (and legal
potential) constructions for consent. In their view, consent can be presumed
because the next-of-kin "knows" in some way that techniques are practiced
on newly dead patients. 44 Consent can also be presumed since a patient's
admission into a teaching hospital is tantamount to giving permission to
receive care from trainees under faculty supervision. 45 From this
perspective, it is preferable 'to presume consent because the next-of-kin
have irrational reactions to death, reactions of fear and guilt that inhibit
survivors. 46 It is further argued that patients who die in emergency
departments have implicitly given at least limited consent to practice and
teach life-saving techniques by using the services of emergency medical
personnel and by merely living in modem society which provides everyone
a right to this care. 47 Even if this is not the case, opponents of the
requirement of consent argue that it is unclear whether survivors have a
right to refuse this permission. 48 According to this view, the right to make
decisions concerning the integrity of one's body is a personal one that ends
with death and may not be claimed by the next-of-kin. 49 A dead body is no
longer believed to be a person and the obligation of respect has less force
than when it is applied to living persons.50 It is also argued that the dead
have no claim for autonomy. 5' Accordingly, these patients can sustain
injuries during the training sessions without violation of their rights.
C. Supporters of the Consent Requirement
Supporters of the consent requirement argue that consent (and in relevant
cases, proxy consent) is a prerequisite for all medical touching, and that the
43. Iserson, supra note 33, at 93.
44. A.D. Goldblatt, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: PracticingMinimally Invasive Resuscitation
Techniques on the Newly Dead,25 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 86, 86 (1995).
45. Orlowski, supra note 32, at 440 (citing a study which found that only 37.5% of
responding teaching hospitals specifically informed patients that medical students were
involved in providing care).
46. Iserson, supra note 35, at 509.
47. Iserson, supra note 33, at 93 (questioning whether members of some religious
groups who oppose "wronging" the dead can recuse themselves from such techniques, but
later benefit from the knowledge gained in performing these techniques on others).
48. Id. at 92.
49. Orlowski et al., supra note 32, at 441.
50. Id. at 440.
51. Iserson, supra note 35, at 509.
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likelihood of refusal of consent is an insufficient justification for not
requiring consent.5 2 They acknowledge the difficulty in requesting consent
of surviving family members, but stress the fact that many requests for
situations, for example organ and tissue
consent are made in analogous
53
autopsies.
donations and
In response to the argument that seeking consent from the next-of-kin
will heighten grief or create anxiety, 54 supporters of the consent requirement
55
argue that it is not as difficult to obtain consent as suggested. They also
argue that, even in situations where there is not sufficient time to establish
rapport with the patient and family, requests that are sensitively made and
framed around the importance of educating future physicians result in
consent. 6 In addition and contrary to expectations, supporters note that
studies have found a negative correlation between the discomfort that
physicians experience while requesting consent and their ability to obtain
consent. 57 Although physicians would rather not approach the family of the
newly deceased to gain consent for potentially objectionable procedures,
58
this discomfort does not override the benefits of obtaining consent.
More importantly, using newly dead bodies without permission often
makes physicians and trainees uncomfortable because their actions are
hidden from the public.5 9 This behavior associates the acts with something
shameful or controversial. 60 When asked, physicians acknowledge that
52. Goldblatt, supra note 44, at 87.
53. Id. at 88.
54. Benfield et al., supra note 6, at 2363.
55. Robert M. McNamara et al., Requesting Consentfor an Invasive Procedurein Newly
DeceasedAdults, 273 JAMA 310, 311 (providing results from a study that examined consent
for endotracheal intubation in newly deceased infants and found that fifty-nine percent of the
families gave consent to perform the procedures). See Mitchel B. Sosis & Ladd Shaner,
Letter to the Auditor, 266 JAMA 1649, 1650 (1991) (discussing a study on the practice of
dead infants that found that in eighty percent of the cases, consent was obtained). See also
Benfield et al., supra note 6, at 2361 (setting forth results of a study in which resuscitation
procedures were practiced on dead infants and where in seventy-three percent of the cases,
consent was obtained).
56. Orlowski et al., supra note 17, at 203. Cf McNamara et al., supra note 55, at 311
(citing a study showing the opposite conclusion, namely that the rate for consent was greater
in cases classified as unexpected deaths (seventy-seven percent) compared with expected
deaths (forty-one percent)).
57. McNamara et al., supra note 55, at 312.
58. CEJA ETHICS OPINION E-8.181.
59. Goldblatt, supra note 44, at 86. See Sosis & Shaner, supra note 55, at 1650
(providing the results of a questionnaire where 69.6% of student nurses and 86.9% of
qualified nurses performing these procedures discussed their personal feelings on such
procedures with their colleagues). See also Denny, supra note 6, at 953 (providing similar
results of a Canadian study).
60. Benfield, supra note 6, at 2363 (arguing that the concept of "self-protection" of
physicians may shed light on the lack of postmortem intubation studies in the literature).
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while the practice can be justified, the deception cannot. 6' Thus, even from
a personal standpoint, physicians and healthcare providers will greatly
benefit from obtaining consent.
Other claims touch upon the negative consequences of not requesting
consent. Some argue that using cadavers merely for the sake of education
and training is disrespectful to the body and find support for such assertion
in the deontological Kantian principle according to which "one may never
use another person for one's own purposes. 62 There may also be a risk of
psychological trauma to family members if they think this practice is an
abuse or violation of their relative.6 3 More generally, supporters of the
requirement of consent argue that modem society is not one that enforces
acts of altruism, but rather protects individual rights and freedoms. 64 In
contrast to civil law, common law courts do not compel a person to permit a
significant intrusion upon his or her bodily integrity for the benefit of
another person's health, even in cases where denying aid would result in the
65
death of the endangered person.
More significantly, the thought that others will be protective of their
body's vulnerability after death often comforts people.66 A special role is
given to the next-of-kin. Indeed, a limited scope of statutes requiring
autopsies or permitting harvesting organs acknowledges the right of the
next-of-kin to protect the corpse. 67 In addition to these statues, the next-ofkin have legal duties to perform after the death of their beloved. It is thus
inferred that not only do next-of-kin have quasi-property rights in the body
of the dead,68 but they also have moral claims on the body of a loved one,
69
which include ensuring it be treated with respect.

Finally, supporters of the consent requirement argue that the need to
practice on newly-dead patients is relative as there are other alternatives
available, such as practicing on animals or on artificial models.7 °
61. Orlowski, supra note 17, at 204. See also Charles M. Culver, Commentary to K. V.
Iserson: Using a Cadaver to Practice and Teach, 16 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 29 (1986)

(emphasizing the idea of deception).
62. Orlowski et al., supra note 17, at 203.
63. Id.at 201.
64.
65.

Goldblatt, supra note 44, at 87.
See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978) (refusing to

order Shimp to donate bone marrow, which was necessary to save the life of his cousin).
66. Goldblatt, supra note 44, at 88.
67. Id.
68. See Alice F. Kerns, Better to Lay It Out on the Table Rather Than Do It Behind the

Curtain:Hospitals Need to Obtain Consent Before Using Newly DeceasedPatientsto Teach
ResuscitationProcedures, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 581, 588-89 (1997).
69. Orlowski et al., supra note 17, at 202.
70. Id. at 205.
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Moreover, it has been indicated that
sessions for teaching these skills
cadavers." Hence, according to this
consent is an offense that can injure
living persons as well.72

using only mannequins and didactic
is not less successful than using
view, practicing on a corpse without
or offend not only the dead, but the

IV. THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

What is the law's response to practicing resuscitation procedures on the
newly-dead without consent? First, there is a question as to whether
consent is a prerequisite to performing resuscitation procedures. Based on a
legal analysis of the general common law principles of consent, the statutes
that deal with consent in general, the statutes that discuss treatment of the
corpse and the rules concerning research on human beings, consent is a
legal prerequisite to performing resuscitation procedures. A second
question, whether implied or presumed consent can be sufficient to the
requirement of consent with regard to practice on the newly dead, will also
be answered. A third and final question relates to the appropriate substitute
decision-maker from whom consent should be obtained. Lastly, the legal
consequences arising from performing the procedure without consent will
be discussed.
A. The Necessity of Consent
1. Common Law
The notion of consent is a fundamental doctrine in law and medical
ethics. Its origin lies in the common law maxim, according to which
medical intervention can only be provided where the consent of the
individual (usually the patient) to be treated has been obtained.73 In Malette
v. Shulman the court held that, as a matter of law, a medical intervention in
which a doctor touches the body of a patient constitutes battery if the
patient did not consent to the intervention.74 It is agreed that the
requirement of consent derives from the "greatest right" 75-the right to
inviolability of a person and to bodily integrity. Conceptually, such a right
71.

Samuel J. Stratton et al., Prospective Study of Manikin-Only Versus Manikin and

Human Subject EndotrachealIntubation Training of Paramedics,20 ANNALS EMERGENCY
MED. 1314, 1316 (1991).

72. Goldblatt, supra note 44, at 89.
73. Schloendorffv. N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). See also Pratt v. Davis, 118
Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905).
74. Malette v. Shulman, [1990] 71 O.R.2d 417 (Can.).
75. Pratt,118 Il. App. at 166.
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is not extinguished with death.
Under common law, there are two general exceptions to the rule of
consent. First, when healthcare providers are faced with legitimate
emergencies, they can administer treatment without express consent.76
Here, the treatment is usually necessary to save a life or to avoid health
complications when the patient cannot provide consent. However, it is well
established that the "emergency exception" does not apply where the reason
for undertaking the procedure without consent has more to do with
convenience than with an immediate need for treatment.77 Under the
second exception, treatment can be administered without consent if there is
an explicit legislative provision allowing so. 7 8 Typically, there are two
types of legislation with regard to this exception: mental health legislation
and public health legislation concerning, for example, preventing the spread
of a communicable disease.79
Practicing resuscitation procedures on the newly dead is not an
emergency situation. In this context, the procedure does not aim to save the
life of the patient. Although the goal of the procedure may be to improve
the knowledge and ability of physicians in training so that they may save
others' lives in the future, this does not fit within the original purpose of the
exception to the consent requirement. As to the second exception, there is
no explicit legislation that supports performing this practice without
consent.
2. General Consent Legislation
The notion of the consent requirement has a place in the Canadian
legislation and all provincial Acts clearly set forth this requirement. In
Ontario, health practitioners who propose treatment for a person can not
administer the treatment, and must take reasonable steps to ensure that it is
not administered, unless (a) they believe the person is capable with respect
to the treatment, and the person has given consent, or (b) they believe the
person is incapable with respect to the treatment, and the person's substitute
decision-maker has given consent on the person's behalf.80 "Treatment" in
this context is defined broadly as anything that is done for a therapeutic,
preventive, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health-related purpose,
76. See, e.g., Marshall v. Curry, [N.S. 1933] 3 D.L.R. 260, 268 (Can.); Murray v.
McMurchy, [B.C. 1949] 2 D.L.R. 442, 443-44 (Can.). See also 64 CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC
1(13) (1991) (providing statutory support).
77.
ERIN NELSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSENT, in CANADIAN HEALTH LAW &
POLICY 111, 118 (Jocelyn Downie et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
78. Id. at 116.
79. See, e.g., Public Health Act, R.S.A. ch. P-37, § 29-36 (2000) (Can.).
80. Healthcare Consent Act, S.O., ch. 2, sched. A § 10(1) (1996) (Ont.).
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and includes a course of treatment, plan of treatment, or community
treatment plan. 81 Practicing resuscitation procedures on the "newly-dead"
can, of course, fall into the definition of an "other health-related purpose."
In British Columbia, the requirement of consent applies to any medical
procedure defined as "healthcare. 8 2 Healthcare is divided into major and
minor procedures.83 The "major" procedures include surgery; any treatment
involving general anesthetic, major diagnostic, or investigative procedures;
or any healthcare designated by regulation as major healthcare. 4 The
"minor" procedures include routine tests to determine if healthcare is
necessary and routine dental treatment that prevents or treats a condition or
injury caused by disease or trauma.85
The general rule in British Columbia is that a healthcare provider must
86
not provide any healthcare to an adult without the adult's consent.
Further, if the patient is presently unable to give consent, the provider
cannot decide whether to give or refuse substitute consent to the procedure
unless having made every reasonable effort to obtain consent from the adult
patient.87 However, with regard to major healthcare, a healthcare provider
may provide major healthcare to an adult without the adult's consent if,
after consulting with appropriate people related to the adult, the provider
decides that the adult needs the treatment and is incapable of giving or
refusing consent to it. 8 In addition, the provider can make such a decision
when the adult does not have a substitute decision-maker, guardian, or
representative who is authorized to consent to the major healthcare; or when
someone who has authority consents to the major healthcare, provides
substitute consent, and the healthcare provider complies with the conditions
set forth above.89
A sound interpretation of the Act is that practicing on dead patients is the
same as treatment which involve a general anesthetic, and thus, not only
does it fall into the category of "healthcare" but it also carries the
characteristics (and hence the consequences) of statutorily defined "major,"
as opposed to minor, healthcare. In order to perform such a procedure
without consent the exception requirements must be met or else such a
81. S.O., ch. 2, sched. A, § 2(1) (1996).
82. Healthcare (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act, R.S.B.C, ch. 181, §§ 1,
5(1) (1996).
83. R.S.B.C., ch. 181, § 1.
84. R.S.B.C., ch. 181, § 1.
85. R.S.B.C., ch. 181, § 1.
86. R.S.B.C., ch. 181, § 5(1).
87. R.S.B.C., ch. 181, § 5(2).
88. R.S.B.C., ch. 181, § 11 (1996).
89. R.S.B.C., ch. 181, § 14(1) (1996).
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performance may be illegal.
In Nova Scotia, a "patient" is defined as "a person who receives
diagnosis, lodging or treatment at or in a hospital." 90 The definition of
treatment is broad and includes any treatment performed in the hospital.
According to this definition, a patient does not necessarily have to be alive
to receive treatment. The general rule states:
[W]here a person in a hospital requires medical or surgical treatment and
is incapable of consenting to the required medical or surgical treatment
for any reason and such person does not have a guardian or there is no
one recognized in law who can give consent on his behalf to the required
medical or surgical treatment, then the Trial Division of the Supreme
Court or a judge thereof may upon ex-parte application by
the Public
9
Trustee authorize the required medical or surgical treatment.
Under this section, a series of requirements must be fulfilled before
performing any procedure and the health-care provider is not allowed to
perform the treatment without consent. If the patient cannot obtain consent,
a court decides the issue. 92
The province of Quebec has a different model of the consent
requirement. The general rule on consent in Quebec states that "no person
may be made to undergo care of any nature, whether for examination,
specimen taking, removal of tissue, treatment or any other act, except with
his consent., 93 However, "if the person concerned is incapable of giving or
refusing his consent to care, a person authorized by law or by mandate
given in anticipation of his incapacity may do so in his place. ' '94 Similar to
the Nova Scotia statute, the Quebec statute sets forth a broad definition to
what is required for consent ("care of any nature") that clearly can include
the practice on the newly dead for training purposes.
In sum, Canada's general consent legislation has incorporated the
common-law requirement of consent to medical treatment, usually
performed by the healthcare provider, and defined this treatment in a broad
way that can include the practice on the recently dead. According to this
legislation, a healthcare provider is not allowed to perform such treatment
without obtaining consent of substitute decision-maker, family members,
guardian, or court.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Nova Scotia Statutes Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. ch. 208 (1989).
R.S.N.S., ch. 208, § 9(1).
R.S.N.S., ch. 208 § 9(1).
64 CIvIL CODE OF QUEBEC 11 (1991).
64 CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC 11.
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3. Legislation and the Treatment of Dead Bodies
Not only does Canada have general consent statutes which imply that
practicing on the newly dead could be illegal but there are also specific
statutes dealing with the proper treatment and handling of corpses. In
Alberta, for example, adult persons may consent, either in writing or orally
during their last illness, "that [their] body or the part or parts of it specified
in the consent be used after [their] death for therapeutic purposes, medical
education or scientific research." 95 When a person has not given consent as
described above, or, in the opinion of a physician, is incapable of giving
consent because of injury or disease, and death is imminent, the statute
authorizes the spouse of the patient, any adult children, adult siblings, adult
next-of-kin, or the person lawfully in possession of the body, to consent on
behalf of the patient for the same purposes, including medical education.96
It is thus, very clear that the legislature did not intend to authorize the use of
the patient's body for medical education without obtaining consent. The
statute authorizes sanctions whenever this provision is violated. 97 The
British Columbia 98 and Ontario9 9 statutes are articulated in the same manner
as the Alberta statute, requiring consent from someone able to give it before
the body is used for any purpose.
In Quebec, there is no special or separate statute for treating the body of
a deceased, and the general rule and the specific rule are consolidated in
section 11 to the Civil Code of Quebec. 10 0 As mentioned, section 11
requests consent for "care of any nature." It is thus easy to assume that
practicing on the newly dead falls into this category.
The provincial model of "gift acts" that address consent and disposal of
the body after death is not unique to the Canadian legal system. In the
United States, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), consistent with
the common law and adopted in some form by most states, expressly grants
the next-of-kin the right to control disposal of the body.0l l Consent is a
major component of the UAGA and has provisions that allow family
95. See HUMAN TISSUE GIFT ACT, R.S.A., ch. H-15, § 4(1) (2000) (Can.) (providing that
the consent must be in writing and signed by the patient or the patient may give consent
orally but there must be at least two witnesses) (emphasis added).
96. R.S.A., ch. H-15, § 5(1) (2000) (Can.).
97. R.S.A., ch. H-15, § 13 (2000) ("Every person who knowingly contravenes this Act is
guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of not more than $1000 or to imprisonment for a term
of not more than 6 months or to both.").
98. Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 211 §§ 4(1), 5(1), 9, 14 (1996) (Can.).
99. Trillium Gift of Life Network Act, R.S.O., ch. H-20 §§ 4(1), 5(2), 9(1), 12 (1990)
(Can.).
100. 64 CIvIL CODE OF QUEBEC 11 (1991).
101.

UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (UAGA), NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON

UNIFORM STATE LAWS,

§3

(1987).
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members to make decisions concerning these issues. 10 2
Another specific model, a rather progressive one, is the Israeli model. 0 3
In Israel, a new amendment to the "Anatomy and Pathology Act of 1954"
now allows doctors to practice medical procedures on dead patients if the
patient granted written permission in advance or if the family consented
after the patient's death.1°4 In addition to the written permission, new
regulations require that three physicians sign a document stating that the
procedure was aimed at treating patients, and only procedures on a specified
05
list are permitted. 1

4. Rules Relating to Research on Human Beings
Practicing on dead bodies for educational purposes is, arguably, for the
benefit of patients. Those in favor of practicing resuscitation procedures on
the recently dead argue that it is a form of "therapeutic research"; that is,
research where the aim is to produce generalizable, practical knowledge.' 0 6
Performing such research requires consent, and usually prior approval must
be obtained from a research ethics board. 10 7 Moreover, with regard to
consent required for research, courts tend to have a more demanding
standard of disclosure where no intended benefit is expected for
participants, as compared to the standard required for therapeutic
08
procedures.1
Choosing to describe the practice of resuscitation procedures as research
102. UAGA § 3. The Act also includes a provision that governs how individuals can
give their bodies to medical schools/hospitals for various purposes.
103. Anatomy and Pathology Act, 1954 (1953-1954) (Isr.).
104. Anatomy and Pathology Act, 1954, § 6(c)(1) (Isr.).
105. Anatomy and Pathology Act, 1954 (Isr.) (including procedures such as inserting an
air tube; inserting a laryngeal mask into the airway; performing a tracheostomy; performing
a vena section; inserting a catheter into the saphenous vein; inserting a catheter into the
external jugular vein; inserting a catheter into a subclavian vein; locating and exposing the
malleolus; inserting an intraossous needle; inserting an intercostal trochar (drain) and
attaching it properly to the chest drain; releasing pressure using a large needle; inserting a
catheter into the bladder; and performing an artificial heart transplantation). For discussion
on the new Israeli rules see Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, Israeli Doctors May Now Use Cadavers
for Training Purposes, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 511 (2001) available at www.findarticles.com/
cf_0/m0999/7285_322/72431794/pl/article.jhtml.
106. Orlowski et al., supra note 32, at 439. For an elaborate picture of different uses for
research purposes done on cadavers see KENNETH V. ISERSON, DEATH To DuST: WHAT

HAPPENS To DEAD BODIES? 119-21 (2d ed. 2001). See generally Dorothy Nelkin & Lori
Andrews, Do the Dead Have Interests? Policy Issues for Research After Life, 24 AM. J.L. &
MED. 261 (1998).
107.
64 CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC 22 (1991).
See also ETHICS REVIEW, RESEARCH
REQUIRING ETHICS REVIEW, ART. 1.1- 1. 14 (Can.), availableat www.ncchr-cnerh.org/english/
code_2/secOl .html.
108. NELSON, supra note 77, at 385.
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is not without criticism; it is neither a "systematic investigation to establish
facts, principles or generalizable knowledge" nor an "activity designed to
test a hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn and thereby to develop or
contribute to generalizable knowledge." 10 9 Interpreting the practice of such
procedures on the newly dead as research when it clearly is not typical
research strengthens the conclusion that practicing on dead bodies without
Because practicing such procedures does not
consent is illegal. 10
contribute to generalizable knowledge or benefit the recently dead, consent
should be required. In sum, a legal analysis based on general common law
principles of consent, statutes that deal with consent, statutes that discuss
the treatment of the corpse, and rules concerning human subject research,
leads to the same result: obtaining consent for practicing on the newly dead
is a legal requirement.
B. The Sufficiency of Implied or Presumed Consent
Consent can be express or implied.11' Once a person has died, consent 1is2
form.
obtained either by directive or by the pre-death signing of a consent
13
For
Implied consent is less clear and can be inferred from circumstances.
example, consent may be implied or presumed in a situation where the
medical procedure is performed unless the patient or next-of-kin objects
("opt-out"). 114 Another situation where consent is presumed or implied
involves situations where a patient gives express consent to a procedure and
the provider infers consent to perform any procedures that may become
necessary during the course of the main procedure." 5 Finally, one can
16
imply consent through application of the reasonable person test. Under
this test, the question of whether the patient would have consented to the
medical treatment is answered by setting forth a hypothetical scenario in

109. BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES & GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, OFFICE OF THE
SEC'Y, PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE
PROTECTION FO HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIOR RESEARCH 15 (1979).
110. NELSON, supra note 77, at 120-25, 129-56.
111. Id.at 113.
112. Id.
113. Id. See O'Brian v. Cunard Steamship Co., 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891). See also
Reynen v. Antonenko [1975] 20 C.C.C. (2d) 342 (Can.).
114. This form of consent is particularly common in Europe, especially in the context of
organ transplantation. Samatha A. Wilcox, Presumed Consent Organ Donation in
Pennsylvania: One Small Step for Pennsylvania, One Giant Leap for Organ Donation, 107
PENN. STATE L. REV. 935, 938 (2003).
115. See, e.g., Villeneuve v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Diocese of Sault Ste. Marie, [1971]
2 O.R. 593, revised [1972] 2 OR. 119 (Can.)
116. NELSON, supra note 77, at 114.
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which the court asks whether a reasonable person in the circumstances of
the patient would have consented to the treatment. The court used such a
test to determine whether a blood donor, who was not told that samples of
his blood would be stored or tested for HIV antibodies, would have
consented to have his blood tested for HIV."17
Although implied consent may express the patient's wishes, express
consent is preferable for two reasons: (1) implied consent leaves the patient
out of the process and therefore runs counter to the philosophy underlying
the law with respect to consent; and (2) express consent provides better
evidence (as opposed to reliance on implied consent) that the patient has
given permission for the proposed treatment. 1 8 Indeed, when relying on
implied consent it is essential that the circumstances from which the
consent is inferred be clearly documented. The circumstances under which
resuscitation procedures are performed-for example, in the intensive care
unit, minutes after death, with the medical team surrounding the patientare less than ideal circumstances under which to ask for documentation.
Besides the doubtful base upon which presumed consent rests, there are
several reasons to ask for explicit consent. Traditionally, situations
involving resuscitation procedures on the newly dead do not fall into the
category of either implied or presumed consent. It is unreasonable to
believe that patients and their families will be aware of the practice of using
the recently deceased for teaching purposes. Also, the number of patients
who die sudden and unexpected deaths in emergency rooms and intensive
care units makes it difficult to interpret the silent behavior of the next-ofkin as consent to these procedures. Further, there are many people who,
because of ideological, religious," 9 or personal beliefs, strongly oppose any
use or interference with their body after death. One cannot fully respect
their convictions by only presuming or implying their consent.
Moreover, the law regards the notion of consent not as a mere contract
between the patient and the physician but as a process aiming to ensure that
no treatment is performed without the agreement of the patient. 2 ° The
procedural character of the consent requirement has led courts to recognize
the patient's right to withdraw treatment at any time or stage of the
treatment after an initial consent was given. 12 ' Accordingly, consent is not
determined by the doctor-patient relationship that ends with the patient's
death. Rather, it has a deeper origin that rests in respect to the patient.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Canadian AIDS Soc'y v. Ontario, [1995], 25 O.R. (3d) 388 (Gen.Div.).
NELSON, supra note 77, at 114
See Kerns, supra note 68, at 609-10 (discussing religious convictions).
NELSON, supranote 77, at 114.
Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119, 136 (Can.).
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C. Giving Consent
When a patient's consent cannot be obtained, treatment should proceed
22
unless the patient's proxy decision-maker consents.1 In Canada, although
family members often make decisions regarding the treatment of their
deceased,123 under the common law and in the absence of legislative
authority stating otherwise 124 the only person who has the legal right to
consent or to refuse treatment on behalf of a patient (who lacks the capacity
to do so) is the patient's court-appointed guardian or the court itself.
An alternative to asking for consent from family members is to
25
"judicialize" the proposed medical process.1 The court's involvement can
be useful when there is irresolvable conflict within the patient's family.
However, "it may be superfluous when it is used merely to formalize a
decision which has already been made and which no one has challenged and
' 126
In the case of
which involves no real dispute, controversy, or conflict.'
practicing on the newly dead, there will probably be fewer controversial
cases within the family than, for example, in cases of passive euthanasia
where the question is whether to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. When
there is little controversy, it is better that the decision to perform the
medical procedure, and thus the consent for it, be obtained from the family.
The court should only be used as a last resort.
It is possible to appease all parties-medical providers, family members,
judicial officers-on the issue of consent. Empirical studies show that
consent is more often obtained when requests are sensitively made and are
framed in terms of the importance of enabling physicians to save other
lives. 127 Thus, it is possible to cooperate and to develop a discourse that
will yield a result that satisfies all parties involved.
Performing resuscitation procedures without consent can have legal
ramifications. The various causes of action in both criminal and civil law
that may be available will be examined and strengths and weaknesses of
each argument will be highlighted in the following section.

122. McNamara et al., supra note 55, at 311 (stating that the spouse was generally more
willing to give consent (seventy-seven percen of the time) than the children (only fifty
percent of the time).
123. 64 CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC 15 (1991).
124. Healthcare Consent Act, ch. 2, § 20 (1996). See 64 CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC 15

(1991).
125.

See PROTECTION OF LIFE: EUTHANASIA, AIDING SUICIDE AND CESSATION
64 (Law Reform Comm'n of Canada, Working Paper No. 28, 1982).

OF

TREATMENT

126.

Id.

127.

Orlowski et al., supra note 17, at 203.
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1. Criminal Offense
Practicing on the newly dead without consent can constitute an offense in
Canada and in some states in the United States. The Criminal Code of
Canada states that "every-one who... (b) improperly or indecently
interferes with or offers any indignity to a dead human body or human
remains, whether buried or not, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years." 128
However, protection of the human corpse through criminal law is not
unique to Canada. Some states in the United States make it a crime to
mutilate or mistreat a corpse. The California Health and Safety Code, for
example, states that "every person who willfully mutilates, disinters, or
removes from the place of interment any human remains, without authority
of law, is guilty of a felony."' 2 9 In Massachusetts, whoever "willfully digs
up, disinters, removes or conveys away a human body... or knowingly
aids in such disinterment, removal or conveying away" is subject to jail
time and monetary penalties.13 ° Ohio has similar provisions. 3
2. Civil Liability
Practicing resuscitation procedures on the recently dead can also result in
civil liability. Almost every province in Canada has specific statutes that
deal with the treatment of dead bodies. 132 These statutes include certain
128.

Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46 (1985) (Can.).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7052 (West 2003). This section, however, does
not apply to any person who, under authority of law, removes the remains for reinterment, or
performs a cremation.
129.

130.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 252, § 71 (West 1982).

131. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2927.01 (West 2003). The statute provides that:
(A) No person, except as authorized by law, shall treat a human corpse in a way
that the person knows would outrage reasonable family sensibilities.
(B) No person, except as authorized by law, shall treat a human corpse in a way
that would outrage reasonable community sensibilities.
(C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of abuse of a corpse, a
misdemeanor of the second degree. Whoever violates division (B) of this section
is guilty of gross abuse of a corpse, a felony of the fifth degree.
132. See e.g., Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.A. ch. H-15 (2000) (Can.) (stating that, in
Alberta, "[ejvery person who knowingly contravenes this Act is guilty of an offence and is
liable to a fine of not more than $1000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than 6
months, or to both"). See also Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 211 (1996) (Can.);
Trillium Gift of Life Network Act, R.S.O. ch. H-20 (1990) (Can.). The Trillium Gift of Life
Network Act states that a defense to such a liability is given to a:
[M]ember of the medical or other staff of a designated facility or any other person
employed in a designated facility for any act done or performed in good faith in
the performance or intended performance of any duty or function or in the
exercise or intended exercise of any power or authority under this Act or for any
neglect, default or omission in the performance or execution in good faith of any
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provisions that make the consent requirement mandatory in circumstances
that can be interpreted to encompass situations involving the practice of
resuscitation procedures on the "newly-dead." Acting without consent is a
direct violation of these provisions and may result in prison time and
fines.' 33 Violation of specific provisions, in this regard, is not unique to
Canada; the UAGA 134 also provides for the imposition of civil liability. In
addition, there are several bodies of law, including tort law, contract law,
trust law, constitutional law, and property law that provide support for
imposing civil liability in addition to criminal sanctions upon those35who
consent.'
practice resuscitation procedures without obtaining informed
a. Battery
While violation of specific legislative provisions can result in civil
liability, violation of tort law principles can similarly result in civil liability.
Typically, treatment of any kind without the consent of the person being
treated results in a battery (the unauthorized physical interference with a
person) whether or not interference causes physical injury, and even if the
patient benefited from the treatment. 136 As set forth in Malette, "[a]ny nonconsensual touching which is harmful or offensive to a person's reasonable
137
Thus, is arguable that the
sense of dignity is actionable" as a battery.
can result in a successful
consent
obtaining
practice on dead bodies without
claim of battery under the principles set forth in Malette.

duty, function, power or authority under this Act.
133. See supra note 133.
134. See generally UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1987), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/
usaga87.htm (stating under what conditions organ donation is allowed).
135. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1979). The Restatements of
Torts specifically identifies a claim for interference with dead bodies. It states that "[olne
who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon
the body of a dead person or prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability
to a member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body."
See Constance F. Fain, Civil Liability of Hospitalfor Negligent Handling, Transportation,
and Disposition of Corpse, 86 A.L.R. 5th 693 (2001) (stating that courts have noted that the
Restatement approach represents a minority view whereas the traditional majority rule
requires wanton, malicious, or intentional interference with a dead body and does not extend
to negligent misconduct). For one of the first judicial opinions finding liability for the
unlawful mutilation of the body of the recently deceased see Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238
(Mass. 1891).
136. LEWIS KLAR, TORT LAW 41 (2d ed. 1996); Malette v. Shulman, [1990] 72 O.R. 417
(Can.).
137. Malette v. Shulman, [1990] 72 O.R. 417 (Can.).
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b. Invasion of Privacy
An invasion of privacy claim is another potential tort claim that can be
brought when resuscitation procedures are performed without first
obtaining consent. There are two questions that arise with regard to a claim
for invasion of privacy. First, does the dead patient have a constitutional
right to privacy? Second, assuming that the answer is affirmative, does
violation of the right to privacy result in civil liability?
The right to privacy, as originally conceived, is the right to be left alone
and includes one's interest in personal dignity and self-respect. 38 The right
to privacy is widely recognized by the international human rights law, 139
although it is not explicitly mentioned in the Canadian Constitution.
However, there is consensus that this right is protected by certain provisions
of the Constitution, specifically in Articles 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms which accords "the right to life, liberty and security
of the person, and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.., and to be secure against
unreasonable search or seizure."'' 40 In the dissenting opinion of the
Rodriquez court, Justices McLachlin and Cory stated that Article 7 of the
Charter, which emphasizes the innate dignity of human existence, protects
the dying since it is viewed as an integral part of living. 141 Applying this
reasoning, one could argue that the person in the intensive care unit,
minutes after being pronounced dead, is still under going the process of
dying and cannot, and should not, be disrupted by the pronouncement of
death itself let alone a resuscitation procedure.
Assuming that the issue at stake involves a violation of the right to
privacy, the question then becomes whether this violation results in civil
liability. There is no consistent approach to liability for the invasion of
138. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890).
139. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR,
3rd Sess., U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), available at http://www.un.org/
Overview/rights.html (recognizing basic human rights). See also The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, availableat http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu3/b/accpr.htm (recognizing rights derive from the inherent dignity of being
human); Council of Europe, The European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(1) (1950),
availableat http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html (recognizing basic human rights).
140. Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms, Part I of the Canadian Constitution Act,
Art 11 (stating that the rights guaranteed in the Charter are subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law "as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society").
Interestingly, in Article 7, the constitutional rights holder is defined by the word "everyone"
as opposed to "person," (ART. 6) or "individual" (ART. 15). This serves as a strong response
to the claim that the dead patient, who is no longer a person, does not have right to privacy.
141. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 630.
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privacy in Canada. While courts have tended not to recognize a tort action
for invasion of privacy per se, 142 over the past few decades there have been
143
breach of privacy.
indications of a nascent common law tort for
144
Manitoba,' 45
Moreover, in four provinces, British Columbia,
147 Privacy Acts have created a
Saskatchewan,146 and Newfoundland,
statutory tort. Section 2 of the Saskatchewan Act, which serves as a model
for the other privacy acts, declares that it is a tort to violate, willfully and
4 8 The tort is actionable
without claim of right, the privacy of another.
without proofof damage.149 Section 3 of the Act describes conduct that, 'in
5
violation of privacy. 0
the absence of consent, is prima facie evidence of a
The Act authorizes a broad range of remedies, including damages, an
injunction, an accounting for profits that have accrued as a consequence of
the violation of privacy, and orders for the surrender of articles or
documents that have been secured through a violation of privacy."'
Accordingly, practicing on the newly dead without consent can constitute a
violation of privacy by virtue of either Section 2 or Section 3.
c. Negligent Practiceon the Dead Without Consent
Of all of the potential tort claims, a claim for negligence is perhaps one
of the more obvious. In order to sue a physician for negligently practicing
on the recently dead without first obtaining consent, the plaintiff must
satisfy the basic elements of a negligence claim: (1) the existence of a duty
of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a causal link between the defendant's
negligence and the plaintiff's injury, and (4) damages.
Thus, the initial question is whether the healthcare provider owes a duty
to the recently deceased. The obvious problem is that upon the patient's
142. See, e.g., Bingo Ent. Ltd. v. Plaxton, [1986] 26 D.L.R. 604, 608 (Can.) ("It would
appear that at common law the tort of violation of privacy in regard to disclosure of private
information has not been recognized in Canada").
143. See, e.g., Saccone v. Orr, [1981] 34 O.R.2d 317; Capan v. Capan, [1980] 4 O.R.3d
740; Roth et al. v. Roth et al., [1991] 4 O.R.3d 740. Despite the movement toward a
common law breach of privacy tort, in a recent case, an Ontario court refused to apply such
an action per se to the circumstances of that case. See Weingeral v. Seo, [2003] O.J. 4277.
144. British Columbia Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 373 (1996). As evidence of the
enforcement of this tort of invasion of privacy in British Columbia see Lee v. Jacobson,
[1992] 87 D.L.R. 401 (Can.).
145. Manitoba Privacy Act, R.S.M., ch. P125 (1987).
146. Saskatchewan Privacy Act, R.S.S., ch. P-24 (1978).
147. Newfoundland Privacy Act, R.S.N., ch. P-22 (1990).
148. R.S.S., ch. P-24, § 2 (emphasis added).
149. R.S.S., ch. P-24, § 2.
150. R.S.S., ch. P-24, § 3 (1978).
151. R.S.S., ch. P-24, § 7 (1978).
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death the doctor-patient relationship, traditionally the source for such a
duty, ceases to exist. Is it possible to argue that the healthcare provider
owes a duty of care to the dead patient based on the former's
representations of a willingness to render assistance if needed and the
latter's reliance on this representation? This might be a more reasonable
assertion then the assertion that there is no continuing relationship between
the dead patient and the provider. However, this assertion is problematic,
raising several new questions. What is the scope of the assistance that the
healthcare provider represented? Didn't the duty cease once the patient
2
(and his reliance) die?'1
Despite these questions, a Missouri Court of Appeal recently held that
such a duty can be established under the UAGA.'5 3 In Schembre v. MidAmerica, the family of a deceased patient brought a negligence suit against
a transplant association and a hospital for removing the deceased's corneas,
bone, and tissue. 54 Although an issue of first impression in Missouri, the
court looked to other jurisdictions to address the issue.155 Specifically, the
court looked to Florida, which had adopted a standard requiring a finding of
acting "without negligence and in good faith" in order for a party to be
immune from civil liability under the UAGA. After setting forth the facts,
the Missouri court stated that while there was "no dispute that MTS [MidAmerica Transplant Services] ha[d] a duty to follow the requirements set
forth under the UAGA in order to compete a valid organ donation,"' 56 MTS
followed those requirements. 57 Thus, the court held that MTS was not
negligent when removing the decedent's corneas, bones, and tissue. 58
Although the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their suit, the case is important
because the court recognized that a healthcare provider does have a duty to
the recently deceased under the UAGA. It remains to be seen, however,
how courts will find such a duty when the medical procedure is not covered
under the UAGA.
Accordingly, it is difficult to infer a duty of care premised on the special
relationship between the patient and the provider. A possible solution from
the next-of-kin's perspective is to assert a claim against the provider for
breach of the duty of care owed to the family or relatives of the dead
152. See Kenneth V. Iserson, Using a Cadaver to Practice and Teach, 16 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 28, 29 (1986).

153.

Schembre v. Mid-America Transplant Ass'n, 2003 WL 21692986 (Mo. App. E.D.

2003).

154.
155.
156.

Id. at *1.
Id.
at *3.
Id. at *4.

157.
158.

Id.
Id.
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patient. 159 Assuming that the doctor does have a duty to the family, what is
the standard of care? Generally, a doctor is required to exercise the same
degree of skill and care that could reasonably be expected of a practitioner
160
According to the "approved
of the same experience and standing.
practice" concept, a doctor is not negligent if she is shown to have acted in
16
accordance with accepted medical practice. ' The rationale is that in a
malpractice suit a judge or a jury does not have the medical expertise or
knowledge of those who testify or argue at trial. Although a bad practice,
performing resuscitation procedures on the "newly-dead" without consent
is, unfortunately, an accepted practice. Despite this, arguing that it is an
"approved practice" is a weak argument since the justification for the
negligence standard-the lack of medical expertise between the judge or the
jury-may not apply here. The question at stake is not what is being
practiced and trained, rather how these procedures are performed. Such a
practice, when done without consent, is contrary to the professional
association guidelines previously discussed and should not be considered
"acceptable."
In negligence cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the
162
Negligence is
doctor's negligence was the cause of the plaintiffs injury.
or is the
harmed
be
dead
the
Can
damages.
actionable only with a proof of
to
"harm"
practice of resuscitation procedures more a "wrong" rather than a
163
If one accepts the proposition that a person can commit a
the dead?
dignified wrong to a dead body, one must accept the causative relation
between the resuscitation procedure and the wrong committed.
Perhaps infringing on the dignity of the dead may suffice for bringing an
action in tort, but as a matter of public policy, is this sufficient to establish
an action in negligence? Again, the legal implications of the resuscitation
procedures, as related to the next-of-kin rather than the dead, may make any
159. Another possible way of inferring a duty of care to the dead was established in the
Supreme Court decision Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 112 D.L.R. (3d), 1 S.C.C. (Can.). In Reibl,
the Supreme Court located the duty to obtain informed consent primarily within the realm of
negligence. Id. Although the court held that the battery claim is appropriate in situations
where no consent was obtained at all (as compared to situations where consent was obtained
but on the basis of incorrect information), the fact that the court found a duty of care with
regard to acts that were not in the strict scope of the initial consent may perhaps support the
view that the court is gradually willing to import also the law of negligence to the concept of
consent. Id.
160. Crits v. Sylvester, [19561 S.C.R. 991; Poole v. Morgan, [1987] 50 Alta. L.R.2d
1203 (Can.).
161. Weingeral v. Seo, [2003] O.J. 4277.
162. Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 72 D.L.R. 289 (Can.).
163. See generally Callahan, supra note 5 (discussing whether the dead can be harmed).
See also FEINBERG, supra note 5, at 83-84 (arguing for a posthumous harm made to the
surviving interests of the deceased).
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discussion about the sufficiency of an action in tort stronger because of the
mental anguish and the emotional suffering experienced by the next-of-kin
upon learning about the procedures.
In sum, because the patient is deceased, difficulties may arise with
respect to each element of the negligence claim if based upon the doctorpatient relationship. However, a negligence claim may be possible when
brought by the next-of-kin and premised on the lack of informed consent
argument.
d. HospitalLiabilityfor Negligent Handlingof a Corpse
Since most resuscitation procedures are performed in teaching hospitals,
the hospital's responsibility for the negligence of physicians and residents
employed by the hospital is also an issue. As in any malpractice suit, the
plaintiff will have to prove the existence of a duty of care, the breach of that
duty, a casual link between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs
injury, and damages. In this context, a hospital can be both vicariously
liable and directly liable.
As a general rule, employers are vicariously liable for torts of their
employees committed in the course of employment.164 Hence, if a doctor is
found liable for an action performed at a hospital, the hospital is
automatically liable. However, although the practice of resuscitation
procedures on the recently deceased takes place in medical schools
affiliated with hospitals, the vicarious liability formula is not that simple.
Doctors in Canada are independent contractors with the hospitals rather
than employees and, 165 as such, the hospital is not vicariously responsible
for their negligence. 166 However, interns and residents who are the main
"beneficiaries" of the resuscitation are regarded as employees of the
hospital. 167 Thus, the hospital may be found liable for the latter's actions
and not for the former's.
In addition to vicarious liability, the hospital can be directly liable for the
patient's care and treatment. The hospital has a duty to its patients to select
and maintain competent and ethical staff and to provide proper instruction
and supervision for the staff' 68 In terms of research conducted at a
164. B. (K.L.) v. British Columbia, [2003] S.C.C. 51 (Can.).
165. Doctors are granted hospital privileges, but they are not paid by the hospital. In the
healthcare system in Canada doctors bill the provincial health plan for their services to the
patient.
166. Yepremian v. Scarborough Gen. Hosp., [1980] 110 D.L.R. 513 (Can.).
167. ELLEN I. PICARD & GERALD B. ROBERTSON, LEGAL LIABILITY OF DOCTORS AND
HOSPITALS INCANADA 384 (3d ed. 1996).
168.

Ellen Picard, The Liability of Hospitals in Common Law Canada,26 MCGILL L.J.

997, 1007 (1981).
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hospital, a hospital may have a direct duty of care to research participants,
derived, again, from the duty to select a competent and ethical staff of
researchers. 169 The duty of care of a hospital-defendant with regard to
practicing on dead bodies without consent should be based on the standard
170
of care that is reasonably expected of someone dealing with corpses.
As in negligence cases brought against the provider, proof of damage to
the corpse and causation can be troublesome. A solution to the problem of
proof of damage could be a claim by a family member against the hospital
for negligent handling of a corpse.
In sum, attempting to hold a hospital liable for practicing resuscitation
procedures raises some difficulties. Whereas hospitals can be held
vicariously liable for medical procedures performed by residents or interns,
a hospital may not be liable for actions performed by physicians. Moreover,
finding a hospital directly liable for negligence is also questionable because
of the impediments which arise in trying to prove a casual relation between
the negligent performance of the hospital and actual damage to the
deceased.
e. Infliction of Emotional Distress
A family exposed to unnecessary distress at a time of profound grief may
be able to bring a claim for infliction of emotional distress. In Lacy v.
Cooper Hospital, the plaintiffs alleged intentional infliction of emotional
distress against a hospital doctor for performing a resuscitation procedure
on their recently deceased child, immediately after the child had been
pronounced dead. 171 The court analyzed both intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 172 The
court set forth four elements necessary to succeed on a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress: (1) the plaintiff has to show that the
defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) that such conduct must be so
outrageous as to be "utterly intolerable in a civilized community"; (3) that
such conduct is the proximate cause of the emotional distress; and (4) that
the emotional distress is unbearably severe for a reasonable person to
withstand.' 73 In comparison, negligent infliction of emotional distress
requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant owed a duty to the
169.

NELSON, supra note 77, at 494.

See generally Fain, supra note 135 (discussing standard of care).
171. Lacy v. Cooper Hosp., 745 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (D.N.J. 1990) ("The nurse testified
that '[a]fler the man was pronounced dead, Dr. Dunst proceeded to perform a thoracentesis
even after I told him that it was unacceptable to practice on patients. He told me he was not
practicing and was going to do it anyway!!"').
170.

172.
173.

Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1034-35.
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plaintiff, that the defendant breached
the duty, and that the plaintiff was
74
injured as a result of this breach.1
In terms of intentional infliction of emotional distress, while it is clear
that the healthcare provider acts intentionally when performing resuscitation
procedures on the dead, the healthcare provider probably does not intend to
cause emotional distress. In this scenario, the doctor's conduct could be
defined as reckless, rather than intentional, in order to satisfy the first
element of the claim. However, it would be difficult to argue that the
conduct is reckless, as studies suggest the doctors, nurses, and interns are
very worried when they do not ask for consent. 175 Thus, while on one hand,
there is no intention, on the other hand, it seems inappropriate to call the
health provider's behavior " reckless" based on the obvious concern these
professionals voice when not first obtaining consent.
In addition, it is doubtful that the practice of resuscitation procedures on
the "newly-dead" could satisfy the second element-that the conduct be so
outrageous as to be "utterly intolerable in a civilized community"especially given the social benefits, particularly, the deeper professional
knowledge and skill of health practitioners who have practiced such
procedures. It would also be difficult to prove the proximate cause of the
emotional distress.
Arguably, the next-of-kin could assert that the
emotional distress caused by the death is exacerbated by the performance of
resuscitation procedures without consent. However, given the fact that
emotional distress is subjective in nature, it would be difficult for the
plaintiffs to convince the judge or the jury that their personal reactions were
unbearably severe, especially76 when asked to do so in light of the
"reasonable person" standard. 1
f Breach of Contract
The doctor-patient relationship, particularly in a fee-for-service system,
is a contractual one. 177 One of the implied terms of the contract is that the
doctor will exercise reasonable care in treating the patient. 178 Reasonable
care includes asking for the patient's consent (or the consent of the next-of174. Id. at 1035.
175. McNamara et al., supra note 55, at 312.
176. See, e.g., Strickland v. Madden, 448 S.E.2d 581 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (representing
a more radical situation where the court did not find that the physician's conduct in
informing patient's daughter that her father had died when he was in fact still alive rose to
the level of outrageous). Even the fact that the physician was allegedly under the influence
of alcohol, in violation of statute, was not evidence of recklessness. Id. at 585.
177.

GERALD ROBERTSON, NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE, in 91 CANADIAN HEALTH

LAW & POLICY 105 (Jocelyn. Downie et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
178. Id.
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kin when the patient is incapable of providing consent). 179 Another 8implied
0
contractual term is that the doctor will treat the patient with respect.1
The advantage of a breach of contract claim over a tort claim such as
negligence is that it enables the plaintiff to avoid having to argue that the
doctor owes a duty of care to the deceased. Furthermore, by bringing a
claim under contract law, the plaintiff does not have to make the even more
difficult argument that the deceased was harmed by the performance of
resuscitation procedures.
However, a claim based on the contractual relationship of the doctor and
the patient is not without problems. One such problem is that traditionally,
once the patient is dead and fees are no longer paid for any service, the
contractual relationship between the patient and the doctor is considered
over.1 8' Another problem is that even if such a contract (or merely the
physician's contractual obligation) exists despite the patient's death, it is a
mistake to imply that the parties intended for the implied terms of
reasonable treatment and respect to still be applicable. Additionally, the
next-of-kin may not be able to establish privity of contract between
themselves and the doctor; thus, they will be precluded from bringing a
breach of contract claim since there was no contract between the next-ofkin and the doctor.
g. Breach of FiduciaryDuty
In addition to being contractual, the doctor-patient relationship is also
fiduciary in nature and requires that the doctor act in good faith and care for
the patient's best interests. 82 More importantly, the nature of the
relationship requires that doctors must not let their own interests (such as
the interest in progress and further development of medical knowledge)
conflict with those of their patients (such as the interest to be respectfully
treated and to be free from unwanted medical intervention). Here again
there might be a problem concerning the nature of the relationship in terms
of bringing suit. Does a fiduciary relationship end with the patient's death?
Or is it a different type of relationship than, for example, that in a
contractual relationship, or the relationship that serves as a foundation for a
duty of care claim? These are questions that remain unresolved.

179.

Id.

180. Id.
181. The patient's stay at the hospital can nevertheless be covered by an insurance
company. If this is the case, then, in the author's opinion, the contractual relationship
between the patient and the doctor continues even after the patient's death.
182. See J.R.I.G. v. Tyhurst, [2001] B.C.S.C. 441 (showing a doctor who did not act in
his patient's best interests).
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h. Due Process
The next-of-kin may also be able to bring a claim for violation of the
deceased's due process rights. Article 7 of the Charter encompasses the
concept of Due Process protection and allows for protection of life, liberty,
and security of person. 183 A claim for violating the newly deceased's due
process rights is likely to be successful. Cornea removal cases provide a
good analogy for comparison.
Although there are no cases on point in Canada, plaintiffs in the United
States have brought successful due process claims under the United States
Constitution in cases where the deceased's body was violated. However,
the American courts did not always recognize the constitutional rights of
the next-of-kin in the body of the deceased. In fact, the first cases rejected
the notion that the next-of-kin had any rights in the body at all.
The Supreme Court of Florida first confronted the due process issue in
State v. Powell, 84 where the petitioner challenged a law authorizing cornea
removal by medical examiners without first consulting the next-of-kin. In
Powell, the next-of-kin advanced two arguments. First, they argued that the
law constituted an impermissible taking of private property. 185 The court
examined at length the "property right" of the next-of-kin in a dead body
and rejected the argument that there was an impermissible taking,
concluding that cadavers are not constitutionally protected private
property.18 6 The plaintiff then argued that the actions of the medical
examiner deprived the next-of-kin of the fundamental liberty right to
dispose of the decedent's remains. In rejecting this argument, the court
declined to apply strict scrutiny and found that the right of the next-of-kin
to a tort claim for interference with burial did not rise to the constitutional
dimension of a fundamental right traditionally protected under either the
United States or Florida Constitution. 8 7 Instead, the court relied on rational
basis review and upheld the law, finding that it was
rationally related to the
88
legitimate purpose of restoring sight to the blind. 1
Following the holding in Powell, the Supreme Court of Georgia similarly
held that there was no constitutionally protected right in a decedent's body.
In GeorgiaLions Eye Bank v. Lavant, the mother of an infant who had died
of sudden infant death syndrome brought suit against a hospital and an eye

183. Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms, Part I of the Canadian Constitution Act,
Art. 7 (1982).
184. State v. Powell, 490 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986).
185. Id.at 1191.
186. Id.at 1192.
187. Id.at 1193.
188. Id. at 1193-94.
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bank for the wrongful removal of corneal tissue of infant pursuant to
Georgia statute authorizing removal for transplant of corneal tissue of
decedents. 189 Although the lower court held that the statute violated due
process, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, ruling that there was no
constitutionally protected right in a decedent's body. Moreover, the court
ruled that the statute authorizing removal for transplant of corneal tissue of
decedents was constitutional if no objection was made by the decedent in
his life or by his next-of-kin after death.
Over the years, however, despite the Powell and George Eye Bank
decisions, the jurisprudence began to gravitate toward finding a
constitutional right in the decedent's body. In Brotherton v. Cleveland, the
court recognized a property claim to a dead body. 90 Mr. Brotherton was
dead upon arrival to an Ohio hospital and the hospital asked the plaintiff,
the widow of the deceased, to consent to donating her husband's organs, or
in the language of the statute and court, make an "anatomical gift" of her
husband's organs.' 9 1 Based on the deceased's aversion to such a procedure,
the plaintiff refused to give her permission. Because of the suspicious
nature of Mr. Brotherton's death (suicide was suspected), an autopsy was
performed. 192 Despite the widow-plaintiff s lack of consent, the coroner
permitted the removal of the deceased's comeas. 193 The plaintiff did not
learn about it until she read the autopsy report. 194 On behalf of herself and
children, the widow filed suit, alleging that her husband's corneas were
removed without due process of law and in violation of the equal protection
clause. 195 Using an analysis similar to that suggested by the plaintiffs in
Powell, the court found that such a claim was entitled to due process
protection and thus invalidated an Ohio provision which was analogous to
the Florida law upheld by the court in Powell. 196 The court implicitly
acknowledged that allowing rights in dead bodies to rise to constitutional
19 7
status, though equitable here, would be disastrous in other contexts.
Although the court recognized the difficulty in calling the claim a
"property" claim, it maintained that the next-of-kin had a "legitimate claim
98
of entitlement" which rose to the level of constitutional protection.

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985).
Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 478-79.
Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 483.
Id.at 482.
Id. at 480-82.
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A stronger move toward construing a dead body as private property was
made in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 99 a recent Ninth Circuit case.
Parents of deceased children brought action against a coroner, alleging
deprivation of property without due process of law, premised on the
removal of the children's corneas without notice or consent. 200 After
analyzing the rules with respect to the possession and protection of dead
bodies, and rejecting former decisions finding there were no rights with
respect to dead bodies, the court held:
[S]erving a duty to protect the dignity of the human body in its final
disposition that is deeply rooted in our legal history and social traditions,
the parents had exclusive and legitimate claims of entitlement to possess,
control, dispose and prevent the violation
20 1 of the corneas and other parts
of the bodies of their deceased children.
The court, thus, concluded that the parents had property interests in the
corneas of their deceased children protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.20 2
By coming to this conclusion, the court followed a similar holding in
Brotherton and reaffirmed the rejection of the Powell decision. There has
been a shift in jurisprudential thinking from the position that the next-of-kin
have quasi-property rights in the body of the recently deceased, limited to
possession of the body for the purposes of burial with no protection under
the Due Process, to a broader view acknowledging the next-of-kin's
property rights in the body of the recently deceased to possess, control,
dispose, and prevent the violation of the body. Such a broad view offers
increased protection of a dead body under the Due Process clause when the
"taking of the property" is done without consent. Although there are no
Canadian cases in this area, such a move by the American courts can be a
guide for both Canadian courts and Canadian plaintiffs to bring successful
due process claims under Article 7 of the Charter with regard to practicing
resuscitation procedures on the newly dead without obtaining consent.
i. DisciplinaryAction
Another possible legal consequence for practicing resuscitation
procedures on the newly dead without consent is for professional
associations to take disciplinary action against health providers for failure
to meet professional standards set forth by the associations. Such a move
199.
200.
201.
202.

Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 786 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 788.
ld. at 796.
Id. at 796-97.
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has proven successful in France where no specific guidelines exist on this
issue. 20 3 There, a prominent anesthesiologist was suspended from his
hospital responsibilities by the French Minister of Health after carrying out
a series of experiments in which a potentially lethal dose of nitrous oxide
was administered to a brain-dead patient.2°
As mentioned above, the AMA has concluded that performing
resuscitation procedures on the dead without consent from the family "runs
counter to an evolving norm of our society and threatens to erode further
the trust of the community in the medical profession suggestion in the
literature.,,20 5 The standard set forth in the AMA's new guidelines can (and
should) apply to other countries as well, specifically Canada, and may serve
as a foundation for potential disciplinary action against providers.
D. PrecautionaryMeasures
How can these unpleasant potential legal consequences be prevented?
Practicing on the recently deceased could be legal without requiring consent
For example, some
immediately after the death of the patient.
commentators have suggested that a state law could require those who
receive driver's licenses to indicate whether the license holder authorizes
the use of his corpse for medical purposes.20 6 Others have argued for
enactment of a state law offering financial compensation for allowing
medical techniques on the newly dead.20 7 Additional solutions include
incorporating permission for resuscitative techniques practice into the
autopsy permission form 20 8 or enacting legislation to permit the use of
corpses for nondisfiguring training procedures accompanied by open
disclosure.20 9 Under the latter suggestion, patients would have the
opportunity to refuse the procedure by advanced directive and families
would be aware that, in absence of such refusal, the procedure would be
performed.2 10 Another suggestion involves including a consent form to
perform resuscitation procedures upon death and admission to a teaching

203. David Dickson, Human Experiment Roils French Medicine, 239 SCIENCE 1370,
1370 (1988).
204. Id. (stating that the experiments were made to support techniques, developed by the
anesthesiologist himself to maintain organs for potential transplants).
205. CEJA ETHICS OPINION E-8.181, supra note 2.
206. See Goldblatt, supra note 44, at 89 (questioning the legal right of the next-of-kin to
veto this authorization).
207. Id.
208. Orlowski et al., supra note 17, at 204. See also Benfield et al., supra note 6, at
2363 (showing this has already been done in some institutions).
209. Orlowski et al., supranote 17, at 204.
210. Id.
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Each of these suggestions requires enacting legislation that focuses on
the specific use of the "newly-dead" and would give an actionable force to
the families whenever violated. Performance of resuscitation procedures is
too serious an issue to be subject to interpretation. On the other hand,
enforcing a requirement that these procedures be done legally cannot be
effective if violation of it does not result in prosecution. Due to the nature
of these procedures and to the fact that many of the families are not aware
of such practices, enforcement of a criminal provision in this context will be
more difficult than one which relates to other criminal provisions against
providers, for example, euthanasia or assisted suicide. Accordingly,
solutions outside the criminal context such as professional discipline should
be seriously evaluated and acted upon.
V. CONCLUSION

Practicing resuscitation techniques on the recently deceased without
consent is illegal. It is contrary to common law principles of consent and it
violates statutes that deal with consent and treatment of dead bodies.
Although the practice of resuscitation procedures is arguably a type of a
research, it is not in accordance with any rules concerning research on
human beings. Consent, in this context, cannot be satisfied by implication
or presumption. It must be explicit. It should be obtained from the
substitute decision-maker, the next-of-kin, or the family and it can be
achieved more easily by mutual respect and understanding. Failure to
obtain consent before acting could arguably be a criminal offense. It can
also result in civil liability. Civil liability can be based on various claims
such as violation of specific statutes (where applicable), battery, invasion of
privacy, negligence, infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, negligent handling of a corpse, violation of due
process rights, and unprofessional action. It is an ethical obligation to
strongly oppose such practices when performed without consent, increase
the public awareness of such practices, and when necessary use the
effective tools that the law has to offer.

211. See Kerns, supra note 68, at 600-01 (showing that this proposal is criticized as
underinclusive as it does not account for patients who enter the hospital as an emergency
case, or who experience sudden changes, turning a routine condition into a critical, lifethreatening one.
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